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Internationally Mobile Capital 
in an Efficiency Wage Model 
John Douglas Wilson 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal system of taxes 
and  subsidies on  capital for an open  economy  in  which  similar  types  of 
workers  are  paid  different  wages.  Phrased  in  popular  terminology,  the 
question  is, What  role do capital taxes  and  subsidies play  in the  optimal 
“industrial strategy”  for an economy with “good jobs”  and “bad jobs,”  as 
distinguished by  wage levels? Since the answer is found to depend on the 
availability of other tax instruments, the paper also investigates the optimal 
choice of  these other  instruments.  Briefly  stated,  the  case for subsidizing 
capital investment in “good jobs” appears rather dubious. In fact, a model is 
presented in which informational asymmetries between the government and 
private  firms justify  a positive  marginal  tax  on capital  investment  in  the 
high-wage sector. 
The  basic  reason  for  wage  differentials  in  this  paper  is  that  worker 
productivity  and wages are positively  related in some firms but not others. 
This relation is a special case of the general phenomenon of  “dependence of 
quality on price,”  which has received  substantial attention in recent years, 
not only in  labor markets, but  also in credit and product  markets.  Stiglitz 
(1987a) provides an extensive review of this literature. For the special case 
of  labor  markets,  “efficiency  wage  theories”  are  reviewed  by  Stiglitz 
(1986),  Carmichael  (1988), and  Katz  (1988).  The main  explanations that 
have been given for the dependence of  worker productivity  on wage levels 
include  worker  supervision  problems,  labor  turnover,  morale  effects,  and 
John Douglas Wilson is associate professor of  economics at Indiana University. 
Some of the research reported here was completed during a visit to Queen’s University  in 
Canada, under the auspices of the John Deutsch Institute.  The author is grateful to Ben Craig, 
Patricia Wilson, seminar participants  at Purdue University and the University of  Toronto, and 
participants  at  the  NBER  Conference  on  International  Aspects  of  Taxation  for  helpful 
comments. 
397 398  John Douglas Wilson 
nutritional  concerns. In their seminal paper, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) use 
the supervision approach to model long-run unemployment  as an efficiency 
wage problem. 
Of special relevance here is the work by Bulow and Summers (1986) on 
industrial policies.  They extend the Shapiro-Stiglitz analysis to include two 
production sectors, one with a supervision problem and one without.  Their 
analysis  shows  that  high-wage  firms  should  receive  a production  subsidy. 
Arvan and Schoumaker (1988) dispute the generality of this result by adding 
a fixed supply of  capital to the  model  and  demonstrating  that the  optimal 
commercial  policy  depends  on  the  relative  labor  intensities  of  the  two 
sectors.  While  neither  paper  analyzes  capital  tax  policies,  Bulow  and 
Summers do conjecture that  “keeping capital at home, and  in the  primary 
sector, may raise welfare by increasing rents created by primary sector jobs” 
(1986, 397). 
I  follow  Bulow-Summers  and  others  by  assuming  that  the  payment  of 
wages  above  workers’  opportunity  costs  serves  as  a  worker  discipline 
device: high wages make employment termination a genuine punishment for 
“shirking”  on the job. But my model departs from the previous literature in 
two significant ways. First, I drop the assumption that utilities  are linear in 
income.  In  the  Bulow-Summers  paper,  a  first-best  optimum  is  obtainable 
through  the  use  of  employment  subsidies  because  total  economic  welfare 
depends  on national  income, not on how  it  is distributed.* In the  present 
paper,  however,  a  first-best  optimum  is  not  obtainable,  even  when  the 
government  possesses  the  same  information  as  private  firms,  because 
employment  subsidies  lead  to  increased  efficiency  at  the  cost  of  a  less 
equitable  income  distribution.  The cause  of  income  distribution  problems 
here  is  not  that  workers  possess  innate  differences  in  preferences  or 
endowments.  Rather, distributional issues arise because the only way to deal 
with worker supervision problems is to provide similar workers in different 
industries with different incomes.  This framework allows me to investigate 
whether the inherently second-best nature of the problem leads to desirable 
forms of capital market intervention. 
The paper’s other distinguishing feature is that consideration is given not 
only  to  the  traditional  case  where  the  government  knows  the  relevant 
characteristics of each firm but also to a case of “asymmetric  information.” 
In particular, the government is assumed not to be certain about the identity 
of those firms with supervision problems.  Rather, it assigns a probability to 
the  possibility  that  a  given  firm  possesses  a  supervision  problem.  This 
specification  makes  no presumption  about  the  severity  of  the  information 
problem; nearly complete information could be obtained as a special case of 
the model where each firm is assigned a probability close to either zero or 
one.  Note  finally  that  the  informational  asymmetry  does not  prevent  the 
government  from  making  the  employment  and  capital  subsidies  that  it 
provides to a given firm depend on the  firm’s chosen  wage.  However,  the 399  Internationally Mobile Capital in an Efficiency Wage Model 
rule  for  doing  so  cannot  depend  on  whether  the  firm  has  a  supervision 
problem. 
To  enrich the economic environment along these lines, I work with a full 
employment  model.  This  allows  me  to  capture  in  a  reasonably  simple 
manner  the  distinction  between  “good  jobs”  and  “bad jobs,”  which  has 
occupied much of the industrial policy debate. In particular, I make use of 
Calvo and Wellisz’s (1978) insightful  way of modeling worker supervision 
problems  within  a  static  framework,  the  main  difference  being  my 
assumption that workers caught shirking in the “primary  sector”  obtain an 
endogenously determined  utility  by  accepting  perfectly  supervised work in 
the “secondary sector”  rather than becoming “self-employed.” 
The paper’s organization and main results are summarized as follows. In 
the  next  section,  I  present  a  two-sector  model  with  both  international 
commodity  trade  and capital mobility.  To  eliminate obvious market power 
reasons for capital market intervention, the economy is assumed to be a price 
taker  on  world  capital and product  markets.  Section  11.2 investigates  the 
symmetric information case  under  the  assumption that  the  government  is 
able to make complete use of  its information  about  private  firms without 
being thwarted by limitations on available tax instruments. Here, the case for 
capital market intervention disappears: each firm should be allowed to equate 
the value of the marginal product of capital with the interest rate investors 
can obtain abroad,  as it would  in the absence of  domestic capital  taxes.* 
However,  worker  supervision  problems  do  create  a  justification  for 
employment  and  wage  subsidies;  and  Appendix  A  demonstrates  the 
desirability of excise taxes. In other words, workers should trade at product 
prices  that  differ  from  world  prices,  and  some  firms  should  face  tax 
incentives  to  increase both  the  numbers  of  workers  they  employ  and  the 
wages they pay them.  If  these other tax instruments are not available, then 
positive  subsidies  on capital  investment  in  the  high-wage  sector  may  be 
warranted.  Using  a simplified  version  of  the  model,  Appendix  B  demon- 
strates the desirability of  such subsidies. But the unavailability of other tax 
instruments is difficult to justify. 
Section  1 1.3  investigates  the  asymmetric  information  case  described 
above.  Here,  capital  taxes  and  subsidies  emerge  as  a  desirable  tax 
instrument,  but  with  a rather  surprising  property:  high-wage  firms should 
face a positive tax  on capital  at the margin,  while  low-wage firms should 
face a positive subsidy. The basic reason for this result is that these capital 
taxes and subsidies lessen the severity of the adverse selection problem in the 
model.  They  allow,  for  example,  the  government  to  further  raise  its 
subsidization  of  high-wage employment relative to low-wage employment 
without  causing  those  firms  without  worker  supervision  problems  also  to 
raise  their  wages  so as to obtain the employment subsidies. The result is 
made  more  understandable  by  remembering  that  the  low-wage  sector  is 
inherently more efficient than the high-wage sector in the sense that it lacks 400  John Douglas Wilson 
a  supervision  problem.  Simply  stated,  the  optimal  tax  policy  encourages 
capital  investment  in  the  sector  with  the  relatively  efficient  production 
process while discouraging capital investment elsewhere. Taken as a whole, 
the results  of  this paper call  into  question the desirability  of  encouraging 
capital investment in high-wage firms. Section 11.4 discusses some possible 
extensions of the analysis. 
11.1  The Basic Model 
I consider a simple two-sector model of a small open economy. The two 
goods  produced  in  the  economy  are  perfectly  tradeable  internationally  at 
exogenously determined world prices. Each good is produced from labor and 
capital. The economy’s total supply of workers is fixed, but each worker’s 
labor  effort  is  variable,  making  the  economy’s  “effective  labor”  supply 
variable.  The  economy  faces  an  infinitely  elastic  supply  of  capital  at  an 
exogenously given world interest rate, r (net of  taxes levied abroad). In the 
following subsections, I describe the individual components of the model. 
1 1.1.1  Production and Trade 
The economy contains a “primary  sector”  (x) and a “secondary  sector” 
(y). Each sector is assumed to behave competitively, the meaning of which is 
fully specified below. For notational  simplicity, the economy is modeled as 
though each sector contains a single firm, but the analysis clearly applies to 
a model where there are any fixed number of  firms in either ~ector.~  Each 
firm  possesses  a  production  technology  described  by  a  strictly  concave 
production  function.  Thus,  there  are  decreasing  returns  to  scale.  This 
function is denoted fx(E,, K,)  for the primary  sector and fy(E,,  K,)  for the 
secondary sector, where Ki and Ei  denote the capital and “effective  labor” 
used in sector i (superscripts identify functions, and subscripts of functions 
denote partial derivatives throughout  this paper).4 My main reason  for not 
assuming constant returns to scale is to allow capital to be perfectly mobile 
internationally without causing the economy to completely  specialize in the 
production of  a single good. Incomplete specialization  is assumed through- 
out the paper, for both the laissez-faire equilibria and the social optima. The 
interpretation  of  the decreasing returns  assumption  is  that  there  is  a third 
factor,  say,  “entrepreneurial  talent,”  that  is  omitted  from  the  production 
function as an explicit argument. 
The economy’s trade balance constraint may be written 
where 
C,  = total consumption of the primary good; 
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K*  = total ownership of capital by domestic residents; 
r  = world interest rate; 
pi = world price of  sector i output. 
This constraint states that the total value of domestic output, plus the value 
of  capital exports,  must be  at least as great as the total value of  domestic 
consumption, calculated at world prices. It is always satisfied with equality 
throughout the paper.  The assumption that the domestic economy is small 
means that both r and p  = (px,  p,,) are exogenously fixed from its viewpoint. 
1 1.1.2  Workers and Supervision 
I now  specify the worker supervision problem, which lies at the heart of 
the model. To  isolate efficiency considerations, all individuals are assumed 
to be ex ante identical. In particular, they possess identical utility functions, 
identical labor and capital endowments, and identical ownership shares of 
domestic profits. The common utility function is denoted u(c,,  c,,, e),  where 
the individual consumption levels, c, and c,,, contribute positively to utility, and 
e measures “labor effort,”  which contributes negati~ely.~  If sector i contains 
Ni  workers who each supply labor effort ei,  then its effective labor is Ei = eiNi. 
At  the  start  of  the  period,  the  primary-sector firm  chooses its  desired 
number of  workers. Each chosen worker then makes an irrevocable decision 
whether to work or to shirk. If he works, he provides the level of labor effort 
specified by  the firm (ex).  In contrast, a shirking worker provides no labor 
effort and faces a probability T, < 1 of being detected. A detected shirker is 
discharged from the firm and obtains employment in the secondary sector, 
where supervision is assumed to be perfect. There, he supplies the level of 
labor  effort  specified  by  the  firm  (e,,) in  return  for  the  common  wage 
received by all secondary-sector workers. Undetected shirkers remain in the 
primary sector and receive the wage given to nonshirkers. 
After  shirkers  have  been  identified  and  reassigned  jobs,  all  sector  i 
workers  choose  their  consumption  levels  to  solve  the  following  utility- 
maximization problem: 
max &,,  c,,,  el 
subject to 
(2)  qxcx + SyCy = Ii  9 
where q = (qx,  qJ  is the vector of  consumer prices (q = p  in the absence 
of  excise taxes),  e  equals ei for nonshirkers and zero for shirkers,  and  Zi 
denotes the total income received by a worker who ends up in sector i after 
all shirkers have been identified. The income variable Zi  satisfies 
(3) 
where n is the nonlabor income each worker obtains from capital and profits, 
and wi is the wage paid to sector i workers. 
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This utility-maximization problem yields demand functions and an indirect 
utility function. Excise taxes are eliminated from the analysis until Appendix 
A  because  they  do not  affect  the  propositions  about  capital  taxation  and 
because their role as an  “antishirking  device,”  while theoretically  interest- 
ing, seems  to be of  little  practical  importance. Consumer prices  are then 
fixed at p  and can be omitted as explicit arguments in the demand and utility 
functions. These functions are denoted cJ(I, e)  for good j demand and v(1, e) 
for utility. 
To prevent shirking in the primary  sector, the utility  of  nonshirkers must 
be  set  at  least  as high  as  the  expected  utility  of  shirkers.  To  write  this 
condition mathematically, note first that the assumption of perfect competi- 
tion  means  that each firm treats the utilities obtained  by  workers  in  other 
firms as exogenously fixed. Thus, the secondary-sector firm chooses wy  and 
ey subject to the constraint 
(4)  v(n + wy,  ey)  2 ii, 
where 6 is the utility level at which the firm faces an infinitely elastic supply 
of  workers.  Profit  maximization  obviously  requires  that  (4)  hold  with 
equality. The primary-sector  firm must then choose w, and e, to satisfy the 
following “no-shirking  condition”: 
(5)  v(n + w,, ex)  2 nXii  + (1 - n,)v(n + w,, 0). 
This condition also holds with equality under profit maximization (indiffer- 
ence between  shirking and not  shirking  is  always resolved  in  favor of  not 
shirking). Since all primary-sector workers are ex ante identical, either all of 
them shirk or none of them shirk. In equilibrium,  none shirk. 
A crucial implication of (5) is that primary-sector workers obtain a higher 
utility  level  than  secondary-sector  workers  in  equilibrium.  While  the 
primary-sector firm can always pay its workers the wage they would get in 
the secondary sector, it must then require them to provide less labor effort. 
Mathematically, if the function ei(n +  wi,  6)  relates firm i’s chosen effort 
level to worker incomes and the secondary-sector utility, then 
(6)  ex(n  + w,,  ii) < ey(n + wy,  ii) 
whenever  w, = wy.  This property  of the  “labor  effort functions”  is used 
repeatedly throughout the paper. 
1  1.1.3  Profit Maximization and Taxation 
This  subsection  introduces  the  tax  instruments  to  be  used  in  the 
subsequent section and describes the profit-maximizing behavior of  firms. 
If firm i picks employment Nj,  capital Ki,  and wage wj, it obtains revenue 
pf[ei(n  + wi,  6)Ni,  Kj] at  a  cost  equal  to  rKj + w,N, + Ti(wi, N,, KJ, 
where  the  function  Ti gives  the  firm’s  tax  liability.  Until  asymmetric 403  Internationally Mobile Capital in an Efficiency Wage Model 
information is introduced into the model, I allow these tax functions to be 
specified in  a way  that  effectively gives the government complete control 
over each firm’s behavior. For concreteness, I work with tax functions with 
the following form: 
(7)  Ti(wi,  N,, K,) = rKiKi + (rwiwi  + T~)N,. 
Thus, the firm faces a capital tax, a proportional wage tax, and a per capita 
employment tax (subsidies are negative taxes). This tax function operates on 
all the relevant margins: capital is taxed at the marginal rate rKi, employment 
is taxed at the marginal rate twiwi  + T~,  and the firm’s chosen wage is taxed 
at the marginal rate rwiNi. 
To  describe the profit-maximizing behavior of  firms, it is convenient to 
write firm i’s profits in terms of effective labor, E, = eiNi? 
(8)  pif(~i,  K~)  - (r + rKi)Ki  -  {[(I + rwi)wi  + ~~]/e’(n  + wi, 
To maximize these profits, the firm chooses the wage to minimize the unit 
cost of effective labor, given in (8) by the expression in curly brackets. The 
first-order condition for this minimization problem is7 
(9)  [w, + ~,/(l  + rw,)]/ei(Zi,  ii) = l/e;(Zi,  ii) 
= [-ve(zi, ei)I/[v,Vi,  eil  - (1 -  ni)V,Vi, 011, 
IT,  < 1,  ny =  1, 
where Zi  = n + wi, subscripts Z  and e denote partial derivatives, and the 
second equality follows from implicit differentiation of  (4) and (5). The firm 
then  chooses its  capital  and  effective labor  to  equate values of  marginal 
products to unit costs: 
(10) 
and 
p,fk(Ei,  Ki) = r  + rKi 
First-order conditions (9)-( 11) will be used throughout the paper. 
The final tax instrument introduced here is a uniform poll tax, collected 
from each worker. The symbol ~t  then denotes nonlabor income net of  this 
poll tax. Without this tax, the government might not be  able to lower the 
incomes  of  secondary-sector workers  as  much  as  desired.  However,  its 
presence  adds  a  fundamental  indeterminacy  to  the  model:  given  any 
equilibrium, there is an equivalent equilibrium with a higher poll tax. This is 
easily seen. As the poll tax rises, after-tax incomes can be held constant by 
raising w, and w,,  by identical amounts. The government budget can then be 
brought back into balance by using the additional revenue to lower T~  and T,, 
until  (1 + r,)w,  + T,  and  (1 + rwy)wy  + T,,  return  to  their  original 404  John Douglas Wilson 
values. Thus, neither first-order condition (10) nor (1  1) is affected by the tax 
change.  Since  w, + T,/(I  + t,)  and  wy  + TJ(I  + fwy) are  also  clearly 
unaffected,  neither is first-order condition (9) disturbed.  Thus, the economy 
is in a new equilibrium that is identical to the old in all meaningful respects. 
Essentially,  the  standard  observation  about  the  irrelevance  of  whether 
workers or firms pay  a tax applies in full force here.  In the next section,  I 
shall anchor the tax system without loss of generality by fixing T~  = 0. 
Despite  the  wide  range  of  tax  instruments  made  available  to  the 
government  in parts of  this  paper,  I  do not allow  the  government  to treat 
detected  shirkers  differently  than  workers  who  start out in  the  secondary 
sector.  Without  this  assumption,  the  need  to  use  interindustry  wage 
differentials as a worker discipline device disappears, thereby eliminating an 
essential  feature  of  the  economic  environment  with  which  this  paper  is 
concerned. A possible justification  is that significant  costs would  likely  be 
required to keep track  of the past work  history  of current secondary-sector 
workers (i.e., did they  “shirk”?),  especially because  these workers would 
have an incentive to claim those past histories most advantageous to their tax 
treatment.8 
11.2  Optimal Government Policy with Symmetric Information 
In the absence of taxation,  the basic inefficiency  in this efficiency wage 
model may be described as underemployment  in the primary sector.  To  see 
this, recall that ex(n +  w,, 6) < ey(n + w y, li) whenever w, = w),.  This 
means  that  the  minimum  unit  cost  of  effective  labor  is  lower  for  the 
secondary-sector  firm than  for the primary-sector  firm: wy/ey  < wx/e,.  The 
primary-sector  firm  will  therefore  set  the  value  of  its  marginal  product  of 
effective labor above the opportunity cost of effective labor, as measured by 
forgone secondary-sector output. 
This reasoning  suggests that  the government  should design a tax system 
that effectively  subsidizes employment  in the primary  sector relative to the 
secondary sector. However, account must be taken of the worsening income 
inequality that may result from doing so. This section shows that such a tax 
policy is generally desirable,  although the form of the subsidies is generally 
complex  in  the  sense  that  it  involves  the  use  of  both  the  wage  and 
employment  taxes  described  in  the  previous  section.  On  the  other  hand, 
government  intervention  in  the  capital  market  will  be  shown  not  to  be 
desirable. This and the other results are demonstrated under the assumption 
that the government has the same information possessed by private firms and 
can design a tax system that uses this information in any desired way. 
11.2.1  The Basic Setup 
Social welfare is defined throughout this paper as the sum of utilities: 
W = N,v(w,,  ex)  + Nyv(wy,  ey).  (12) 405  Internationally Mobile Capital in an Efficiency Wage Model 
This  welfare  function  can also be  thought  of  as  representing  a  worker’s 
expected  utility,  assuming  that  all  workers  have  an  equal opportunity  of 
being picked for a primary-sector job. Only nonshirkers appear in W because 
nobody shirks in equilibrium. 
Using  its  taxing  powers,  the  government  effectively  exercises  complete 
control over the production and wage policies of all firms. The government’s 
welfare-maximization  problem  may  then  be  set  up  with  the  government 
treated as though it directly chooses an income-effort vector and input vector 
for each firm i, denoted  (Ii,  ei)  and  (Ni,  Kj).  Employment  levels N, and N, 
must add up to the total number of workers in the economy, denoted N*. By 
using  the  workers’  budget  constraints  to  reexpress  the  trade  balance 
constraint given by (1), it is then possible to obtain the following formulation 
of the government’s maximization problem: 
(PI)  Max N,vV,,  ex) + N,v(I,,  ey) 
subject to 
(13)  p,f”(e,N,,  K,)  + PyfY(eyNy,  K,) + m*  -  K, -  K,) 
vV,,  ex) -  .rr,v(!,,  ey) -  (1 -  n,)v(I,,  0) 2 0, 
-  N,I,  -  NJ,  2 0 
(14) 
(15)  N, + Ny = N*. 
After  the  government  solves  this  problem,  it  can then  decentralize  the 
solution  using  the  tax  instruments  introduced  in  section  11.1.3. The 
properties of this tax system are discussed in detail below. 
Let A and p denote Lagrange multipliers for constraints (13) and (14), and 
substitute N* - N, for Ny  to get rid of  constraint (15). The Lagrangian for 
problem (Pl) may then be written 
(16)  L  = N,v(l,,  ex) + (N* -  N,)v(Z,,  e,) 
+ A{P,f”(e.xN,, K,)  + P,Pk-,(N*  -  NX)?  K,1 
+ r(K* -  K, - K,) -  N,I,  - (N* -  Nx)Zy} 
+ P{v(l,,  ex) - nxv(ly,  e,) - (1 - nX)4,,  0)). 
For  the  subsequent  analysis,  both  constraints  are  assumed  to  bind  at  the 
margin, implying that 
(17)  A>0,  p>O. 
The  first  inequality  must  hold  since  A  represents  the  marginal  value  of 
foreign  exchange,  which  is  necessarily  positive  in  this  model.  The 
Bulow-Summers  paper has the  property  that  p = 0, but  they  assume that 
workers  are  risk  neutral,  in  which  case  there  is  no  social  cost to  income 
inequality.  The  government  can  achieve  a  first-best  allocation  simply  by 406  John Douglas Wilson 
making the difference between primary and secondary incomes large enough 
to eliminate shirking. In the present paper, positive risk aversion is assumed, 
so increasing the spread between incomes to prevent shirking has a positive 
social cost, measured at the margin by the multiplier p. 
I  describe  the  solution  to  this  problem  in  the  subsequent  subsections. 
First  I  take  up my  main  concern, capital  taxes. Then I  discuss  the  other 
taxes  and  argue  that,  under  the  optimal  tax  policy,  the  primary  sector 
should indeed be the  “high-wage’’  sector, although this is not always true 
under laissez faire. 
11.2.2  The Case against Capital Taxation 
Capital  taxes  play  no  role  in  this  model.  In  particular,  the  following 
proposition  shows  that  each  firm  should  be  allowed  to expand  its  capital 
stock to the point where the value of  the marginal product of capital equals 
the world interest rate. 
Proposition  1: At the optimum, 
Proof: Differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to K, and K,,  and set the 
derivatives equal to zero. The result follows immediately. Q.E.D. 
This  result  is  related  to  Diamond  and  Mirrlees’s  (1971)  finding  that 
aggregate  production  efficiency  is desirable  when  all  commodities  can be 
taxed  at  any  desired  rates. Optimal  commodity  taxation  allows  consumer 
prices  to  be  varied  independently  of  producer  prices,  thereby  eliminating 
any reason to tolerate production inefficiency. In the present case, however, 
the small country  assumption  implies that the  world product prices, p, are 
fixed.  Thus, deviations  from an efficient  capital  allocation  cannot  have  a 
desirable effect on the consumer prices, q, even when the government fails 
to  employ  an  optimal  excise tax  system.  For  this  reason,  proposition  1 
holds regardless of  whether the government uses excise taxes. 
Proposition  1 does require  the  use  of  wage and employment  subsidies, 
however.  I analyze these instruments below.  If  they  are assumed  not to be 
available,  then  examples  can  be  constructed  in  which  social  welfare  is 
increased by subsidizing capital in the primary sector or taxing capital in the 
secondary sector. One such example is given in Appendix B. However, the 
unavailability  of  all  other tax  instruments  is  difficult  to  justify.  A  more 
reasonable approach would be to limit the use of these other instruments by 
explicitly incorporating informational problems into the model. Section 11.3 
follows this approach. 
Although  I  have  not  explicitly  considered  foreign  tax  systems,  their 
existence need not change the results.  Suppose that the domestic economy 
under  consideration  is  a  capital  importer,  and  assume,  as  commonly 
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domestic government. Then foreign investors are indifferent about where to 
invest if  and only if 
g[l -  max(b, b*)]  = g*(1 - b**), 
where b and b*  denote the tax rates imposed by  the domestic and foreign 
governments on foreigners’ domestically located capital investments, b**  is 
the  tax  imposed  by  foreign  governments  on  foreigners’  foreign-located 
capital investments, and g and g*  denote the before-tax returns that  these 
investors receive on domestically and foreign-located capital investments. As 
argued  by  Slemrod  (1988),  the  domestic  government  maximizes  social 
welfare by  setting b = b*  since raising b to b*  merely transfers tax revenue 
from  the  foreign  government  to  the  home  government  without  affecting 
private  investment  incentives.  But  the  tax  does  affect  “public  tax 
incentives”  by  lowering  the  social  cost  of  capital  from  g*(1 - b**)/ 
(1 - b*)  to  g*(1 - b**)  since  foreign  investors  now  pay  b*  to  the 
domestic government for every unit of  their domestic investment. In other 
words, g*(1 - b**) now serves as the relevant “world  interest rate,”  r, in 
both the trade balance constraint (eq. [13]) and proposition 1. As a result, 
the  domestic government now  finds  it  advantageous to  provide  domestic 
firms with an investment subsidy, s,  that is carefully designed to lie outside 
the tax crediting system used by  foreign governments but is set equal to b* 
so that domestic firms expand investment to the point where the values of 
their marginal products equal g*(1 - b**).9  The net effect of  this domestic 
tax policy is to lower the social opportunity cost of  capital without raising 
any tax  revenue. In other words,  the statement that capital should not be 
taxed still holds in the sense that the optimal b*  - s equals zero. Similarly, 
the subsequent results about capital taxation may be reinterpreted as results 
about  the  optimal b*  -  si  for  each  firm  i when  foreign tax  crediting is 
practiced. 
1  1.2.3  The Optimal Tax Policy 
With the use of capital taxes having been ruled out, it is useful to ask how 
the government’s other tax instruments should be chosen. My  first result is 
that primary-sector wages are higher than secondary-sector wages under the 
optimal tax system, given reasonable assumptions about the utility function. 
This result does not follow immediately from the specification of the model 
since an alternative way of  satisfying the no-shirking condition would be to 
keep the primary-sector effort level (ex) relatively low. Indeed, Carmichael 
notes  that  “it  is  simply  not  obvious  what  (if  anything) efficiency wage 
models  predict  about  wage  differentials in  the  cross  section.  The  results 
depend on the precise way in which the firm’s . . . characteristics combine 
to affect the position and shape of the entire wage/productivity relationship” 
(1988, 27-28).  His comment concerns the laissez-faire behavior of firms. If 
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a rather strong case can be made for providing primary-sector workers with a 
higher income than secondary-sector workers. In particular, I now prove the 
following. 
Proposition  2:  I,  must  exceed  I,,  at  the  optimum  if  the  following 
assumptions hold: 
i. v,(f,  e)  declines with f and is nonincreasing in e; 
ii. vf(Zx,  ex) -  (1 -  T,)v,(Z,,  0) > 0. 




Pro08 Differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to income levels to obtain 
N,dIx,  e,) - m, + P[vf(Ix, e,)  - (1 -  ~,)vfVx9  011  = 0 
N,,V,(I,,,  e,,) - my -  PTXVf(lY9  ey)  = 0. 
Combining (18) and (19) gives, 
(20)  VfV,,  4 - VAI,,, ey) =  -PN,-'[vAI,,  ex) - (1 - ~,)4,,  011 
- PN;'nxvf(fy,  ey). 
Assume  now  that,  contrary  to  the  claim,  I, 5  I,,.  To  satisfy  the 
no-shirking  condition,  v(I,,  ex)  must  exceed  ~(l,,, e,,). Thus,  ex < e,,.  By 
assumption  i, it follows that v,  (Ix, ex) 2  v,(Z,,,  eJ. But, under assumption 
ii, (20) implies that vf(Zx, ex) < vI(Z,,, e,,),  which is a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
Assumption  i  is  quite  weak  since  the  marginal  utility  of  income  is 
normally  thought  of  as rising  with  leisure  and  an  increase  in  e  may  be 
viewed as a reduction in leisure.  Assumption ii is also reasonable: although 
an increase in I,  could increase the incentive to shirk in cases where T, is 
near zero and shirking workers possess relatively  high  marginal utilities of 
income,  such  a case is rather extreme.  With  proposition  2 serving  as the 
justification,  I  will  therefore presume  that  the primary  sector is the  high- 
wage sector throughout this paper. 
I now investigate the signs of the optimal per capita employment taxes and 
proportional  wage  taxes,  T~ and  tWi. Recall  that  these  taxes  combine  to 
produce the following marginal tax on employment in sector i: 
(21)  Ti  = twiWi + Ti. 
The marginal  wage  tax  is  tWiNi.  The next  proposition  shows that  both 
employment and the wage should be subsidized at the margin in the primary 
sector but not in the secondary sector. The subsidies are financed with the 
poll tax. 
Proposition  3: There  exists  an  optimal  tax  system  with  the  following 
properties: 
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Proof:  To  prove  that  t,  < 0  and  t,  = 0,  first  differentiate  the 
Lagrangian with respect to e, and ey, giving the first-order conditions 
and 
and 
(25)  vl(lyr  ey) + v,(Zy, ey)(dey/dZy)  = 0. 
If  (22) and (23) are multiplied by  aexldz,  and aey/aZy, respectively, and the 
results are added to the first-order conditions for I,  and  Zy (eqq.  [18] and 
[19]), then (24) and (25) can be used to obtain 
(26)  p,f”,(E,,  K,)(dexla&)N, = N, - W1 -  ~F,)V~(I,,  0) 
and 
(27) 
On the other hand, combining the first-order conditions for profit maximization 
given by  (9) and (1 1) yields 
(28) 
and 
pYfYE(Ey,  Ky)(deY/aZy)Ny  = Ny . 
p,fz(E,, K,)(aex/aZ,)Nx = (1 + t,,IN, 
(29) 
twy = 0. 
pyfY,(Ey,  Ky)(deY/~Iy)Ny  = (1  + twy>Ny  . 
Equations (26) and (28) then yield t,  < 0, while (27) and (29) imply that 
As discussed in Section 11.1.3, T~  may be set equal to zero without loss of 
To  prove that T, < 0, differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to N, to 
generality. With tWy  also equal to zero, it follows that Ty = 0. 
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Since  X > 0  and  the  no-shirking  condition  requires  that  v(Z,,  ex) > 
v(Zy, ey),  (30) and (31) give 
(32) 
By the first-order condition for profit maximization given by  (1 l), 
(33) 
P,fX,(E*,  K,k, - w, <  Pyf;(Ey, Kyky - w)’ . 
pij$(Ei,  Ki)ei -  wi  = twiwi  + T~  = T.  I’ 
Substituting (33) into (32) and using Ty = 0 gives T, < 0. Q.E.D. 
Both Calvo (1985) and Bulow-Summers  also demonstrate the desirability 
of  employment  subsidies  on  primary-sector  jobs,  financed  by  taxes  that 
impose  a  burden  on  self-employed  workers  (Calvo)  or  secondary-sector 
workers (Bulow-Summers).  Bulow-Summers find that these subsidies should 
be used  to equate the  value of  a worker’s  marginal  product  across sectors 
(see their fig. 2).  Such a use is not generally desirable in the present model 
because  equity  considerations  eliminate  the  desirability  of  satisfying  the 
standard efficiency  conditions  (my proposition  1 being a major exception). 
In fact, the relation between the values of the marginal products of labor in 
the two sectors cannot be signed in general. 
An intuitive explanation may be provided for t,  < 0 in proposition 3. By 
(9), the marginal rate of  substitution between labor effort and income in the 
primary  sector is less than the additional incomes that workers must receive 
to induce them to provide another unit of labor effort: 
(34)  -  ve(Zx,  e,)/v,(Z,,  e,) < (deX/dZ,)-l 
In the absence of employment and wage taxation, however, (28) implies that 
(35)  p,fi(E,, K,)  = (de*/dZ,)-l. 
Thus,  we  have  a  situation  in  which  the  marginal  rate  of  transformation 
between effective labor and income exceeds the corresponding marginal rate 
of  substitution; that  is, the  marginal  benefit  of  additional  effort is  greater 
than the marginal cost.  For this reason, subsidies should be used  to induce 
the  primary-sector  firm  to  raise  its  wages  and  thereby  induce  workers  to 
supply more labor effort without shirking. 
In  contrast  to  this  result,  there  is  no  role  for  wage  subsidies  in  the 
Bulow-Summers  model  because  all  nonshirking  workers  are  assumed  to 
provide one unit  of  labor effort, regardless  of  price  incentives.  The result 
also  differs  from  Johnson  and  Layard’s  (1986,  963)  conclusion  that  a 
positive proportional  tax on a firm’s total wage bill is a desirable means of 
financing a per capita subsidy on employment, the argument being that the 
combined effect of the two taxes is to lower unemployment  in their model. 
They consider a one-sector  efficiency  wage model based on labor turnover 
behavior.  The proportional  wage  tax  is  completely  passed  back  onto  the 
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lowering all after-tax wages by the same amounts. Such a tax plays the same 
role  as  my  poll  tax:  it  raises  revenue  without  affecting  the  marginal 
behavioral incentives faced by workers and firms, 
Note finally that my explanation for wage subsidies in the primary sector 
does not cany over to the secondary section because the absence of a super- 
vision problem there implies that pyfi(Ey,  K,)  =  - ve(Zy,  ey)/vI(Zy,  e,) in 
the absence of taxation. 
11.3  Asymmetric Information 
I  now consider informational  asymmetries as a possible justification  for 
positive  or  negative  taxes  on  internationally  mobile  capital.  My  basic 
assumption about information is that the government  possesses  incomplete 
information about the identity of those firms with efficiency wage problems. 
In other words, the government is not certain about whether a given firm is 
in the “primary sector”  (x) or the “secondary sector”  (y).  To formalize this 
idea, I assume that the economy contains a fixed number of firms, indexed 
by  i = 1,  2, . . . ;  and that the government attaches a probability +i  to a 
firm i  being  a  “type x  firm,”  in  which  shirking workers  are caught with 
probability  IT,  < 1, and a probability  1 -  +j  to the firm being a  “type y 
firm,”  where  the  detection  probability  is  7cy = 1.”  Thus, a given  firm’s 
effort function is either ex(Z, z2)  or eY(Z,  E), as previously defined. 
To  isolate  this  particular  source  of  uncertainty  from  uncertainty  about 
production  technologies,  I  continue to  assume that  each firm’s production 
function  is  known,  Y(E,  K) for  firm  i.”  Issues  concerning  unknown 
characteristics  of  production  functions  are  discussed  at  the  end  of  this 
section. Note,  however,  that  this  specification can be  made  to  handle  the 
empirical  observation  that  capital  intensive  firms tend  to  pay  high  wages 
simply by  making  the  +i’s  relatively  high for firms with relatively  capital 
intensive technologies. In fact, the model may be transformed  back into a 
symmetric information model by assuming that +i  equals zero or one for all 
i. To  avoid obvious qualifications  on the results, I henceforth assume that 
0 < +i  < 1 for every i. 
To  make  a firm’s worker  detection  probability  unobservable,  additional 
assumptions must be made about which of the firm’s actions the government 
can  or  cannot  observe.  The  government  could  infer  the  firm’s  shirker 
detection  probability  from  observations  of  the  wage  that  the  firm  pays 
workers  and  the  effort  level  that  it  demands  in  return.  To  eliminate  this 
possibility, the obvious assumption  to make  is that the government  cannot 
observe effort levels.  But the government  could still use its knowledge  of 
production  functions  to  infer  effort  levels  from  observations  on  wages, 
outputs,  employment  levels,  and  capital  stocks.  Of  all  these  variables,  a 
firm’s capital stock is by far the most difficult to measure in practice. Thus, 
I  create  an asymmetric information problem  by  making  the  capital  stock 
unobservable.  Baron and Myerson (1982) follow a similar approach in their 412  John Douglas Wilson 
seminal article on regulation by  assuming that some parameters of a firm’s 
cost  function  are  unobservable.  Later,  I  argue that  other  choices  of  the 
unobservable variable do not affect my results. A natural direction for future 
research  would  be  to  construct  a  model  in  which  the  capital  stock  is 
imperfectly observed. 
Some readers may now  ask, How can you  study capital taxation using a 
model in which the government does not observe capital? The answer is that 
the  government’s  ability to tax those  variables  it  does observe  effectively 
allows it to tax capital.  In particular,  the  total  tax paid  by  a firm  i can be 
made a function of its wage w, output Q,  and employment N: T’(w,  Q, N). 
The marginal  tax on another unit of capital is then (dT’/dQ)(dQ/dK),  where 
dQ/dK is the  marginal product  of  capital.  Under  profit  maximization,  this 
marginal tax equals piA(Ei,  Ki) - r for firm  i. 
Put differently, there is  never any loss of  generality in arbitrarily picking a 
single output or input to be untaxed because only relative prices matter.  The 
limitation placed here on the government’s taxation powers is not that capital 
cannot be taxed directly but rather that the government does not possess the 
information needed to optimally tailor the tax function to differences between 
primary- and secondary-sector firms. Instead, it must confront any firm i with a 
tax function that is independent of its type, T’(w,  Q,  N).12 My main concern is 
whether the optimal tax system effectively taxes or subsidizes a firm’s capital at 
the margin, as measured by pifjj(Ej,  K;) - r. 
13 
11.3.1  The Government’s Maximization Problem 
To  pinpoint  the  role of  the informational  asymmetry,  it is useful  first to 
pose  the  government’s  optimization  problem  for  the  case  where  the 
government knows each firm’s type, but with only those variables that are 
observable in the  asymmetric  information case treated as control variables. 
In particular, capital and effort levels may be omitted as control variables by 
inverting the production relation for each firm i, Q  =  f[e’(’)(l,  ii)N,  K]  if 
firm i’s type is j(i), to obtain 
(36)  K = Ki[Q,  ej(;)(l,  fi)N]. 
This  leaves  the  equilibrium  secondary-sector  utility,  12,  and  the  income- 
production vector for each  i, (li,  Q;,  N;),  as the control variables.  Problem 




Max xi  Niv[li,  ej(i)(li,  fi)] 
rK*  + CibiQi  - rKi[Qi, @(li,  ii)Ni] -  Nilj}  2 0, 
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The  no-shirking  condition  from  problem  (Pl) does  not  appear  in  (P2) 
because it has been incorporated  into the effort functions. Each secondary- 
sector  firm  provides  workers  with  the  equilibrium  utility,  v[Zi,  eY(Zi,  &)] 
= 6, while  primary-sector  workers  receive  higher  utilities  to  prevent 
shirking: v[li,  ex(Zi,  6)]  > &.  Note that this utility differential will generally 
differ across firms with different production functions because incomes will 
differ.  For  any  pair  of  primary-  and  secondary-sector  firms,  however, 
propositions 1-3  continue to hold. Of greatest interest here is proposition  1, 
which says that no firm’s capital should be taxed or subsidized at the margin. 
Now  consider the  asymmetric information problem.  It is again best  to 
proceed  indirectly  by  setting  up  the  optimization  problem  with  outputs, 
employment  levels,  and  incomes  treated  as  control  variables  rather  than 
optimizing  directly  over  the  set of  permissible  tax  functions.  Since  the 
government  does  not  know  whether  a  given  firm  i  is  type  x  or type  y, 
however,  it must choose a wage-production  vector for both contingencies: 
(wix, Q,,  Nix) and  (wiy,  Qiy,  NiY).l4  Furthermore,  these  vectors  will  be 
feasible only if the firm can construct a tax function, T’(w, Q,  N), such that 
(wix, Qix,  N,)  gives the firm at least as high a profit level as (wiy,  Qiy,  Niy) 
if  the firm’s type is x  and, conversely,  if  its type is y. Equivalently,  there 
must exist payments  Ti,  and Tiy such that the profit function for the type x 
firm satisfies 
(39)  pi&  - wirN, - rKi[Q,, ex(n + wir,  ii)N,] - Ti,  2 pieiy 
- wiylviy - rKi[Qiy,  e”(n + wiy,  ii)Niy] - Tiy , 
while the profit function for the type y  firm satisfies 
(40)  pieiy -  wiy  Niy -  rKi[Qiy,  eY(n + wiy,  B)Niy] -  Tiy L pieix 
- waiI - rKi[Q,, eY(n + w,,  C)Nix] - Ti,  . 
These are completely new types of  constraints,  known in the principal- 
agent  literature  as an  “incentive-compatibility  constraints.”  They  can be 
combined into a single constraint by adding (39) and (40) together, canceling 
common terms on the two sides of the inequality, and rearranging the result 
to obtain 
(41)  Ki[Qiy,  ex(n + wiy,  ii)Niy] -  Ki[QiI,  ex(n  + wix,  ii)N,] 
2 Ki[Qiy,  eY(n + wiy,  ii)Niy] -  Ki[Q,, ey(n + wir,  ii)N,]. 
This constraint can be understood by observing that the optimal tax problem 
being considered here is equivalent to the design of an optimal “truth-telling 
mechanism.”  The  government  asks  firms  to  name  their  types,  uses  the 
answers to control their production activities, and ensures that these answers 
are truthful by awarding the firms with positive or negative subsidies based 
on  their  answers.  Constraint  (41)  ensures  that  such  subsidies  exist  by 414  John Douglas Wilson 
requiring that the incentive to reveal its type as x rather than y, measured in 
terms of capital cost savings, is at least as great for an actual type x firm as 
for an actual type y  firm.  By  the famous “Revelation  F’rinciple”  from the 
principal-agent literature, no sacrifice in welfare is incurred by  considering 
only truth-telling mechanisms. 
There is no  need  to include a separate constraint  requiring  that  the tax 
function allow each firm i to earn nonnegative profits: pi Q, - wVNV - r 
K’[QV,  &(n  + wii,  fi)  NV] - Tq 2  0 for j  = x,  y, where To is again the tax 
firm  i  owes if  it chooses (wij,  Qij, NJ. Such constraints  would  never be 
binding. To see this, suppose that a given tax function violates one of them. 
Then the government can lower the total tax owed at every (w,  Q,  N) by the 
same amount until profits become nonnegative for both types of  firms. This 
change in the tax function obviously  does not affect the profit maximizing 
(w,  Q,  N) for either type, and its effect on nonlabor incomes can be offset by 
a reduction in the poll tax (recall that n is nonlabor income net of this tax). 
With (41) representing  the only new constraint  for the problem, there  is 
no  need  to  include  transfers  Ti,  and  Tiy as  explicit  variables  in  the 
maximization  problem.  In contrast,  the regulator  in  Baron  and Myerson’s 
paper possesses an objective function that contains the subsidies paid to the 
monopolist.  The reason for this difference is that Baron and Myerson treat 
consumers and the monopolist as separate agents and assume that income in 
the hands of  consumers has a greater social value than income in the hands 
of  the  monopolist.  This  assumption  bears  a close relation  to  Laffont  and 
Tirole’s  (1986)  assumption  that  there  is  an  exogenously  determined 
deadweight  loss associated  with the transfer of  income from consumers to 
the monopolist.  In the present model, however, workers are also owners of 
the  firms,  and  the  transfers  provided  to  the  firms  can  be  financed  by 
nondistortionary  taxes.  Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) also study a class of 
principal-agent problems in which the income transfers to the agent do not 
enter the principal’s objective function. 
The  government’s  maximization  problem  may  now  be  stated  in  full. 
There is no need to include wix and n as separate control  variables  in  this 
problem because only their sum matters. Thus, the control variables are the 
equilibrium  utility,  12,  and  an  income-production  vector  for each  firm  i, 
(Zjx, Qix,  N,x,  Ziy,  Qjy,  NiJ. With  +i  denoting firm  i’s probability  of  being 
type x, these variables are chosen to solve 
subject to 
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for all  i.  As  shown,  I  require  only  that  the  trade  balance constraint  and 
employment  constraint  hold  in  an  expected  value  sense.  The  assumption 
underlying this specification is that the number of firms is large enough to 
eliminate uncertainty about trade and employment in the aggregate. 
The major difference between problems (P2) and (P3) is the presence of 
the  incentive-compatibility  constraint  in  the  latter.  But  this  difference  is 
irrelevant if the incentive-compatibility constraint does not bind. Appendix C 
demonstrates  that  there  exist  cases  where  the  incentive-compatibility 
constraint does bind and cases where  it does not.  Since the example given 
there assumes that consumers are risk neutral, the analysis demonstrates that 
the  informational  asymmetry  may  by  itself  prevent  the  attainment  of  a 
first-best optimum. I now  discuss the implications  of  a binding  incentive- 
compatibility constraint for capital taxation. 
1  1  .3.2  Capital Taxation 
This section presents  an  argument for taxing primary-sector capital  at a 
positive  rate  and  secondary-sector capital  at  a negative rate.  The driving 
force behind the result is that the primary sector has an inferior supervision 
technology. Simply stated, tax policy should discourage investment in firms 
with inferior production processes. 
To prove  these results,  I  need  the  additional  assumption  that  labor and 
capital are complements in the sense that an increase in either factor raises 
the  marginal  product  of  the  other: fiEK(E,  K)  > 0.15  Violations  of  this 
assumption  would  be  hard  to justify  at  the  current  level  of  aggregation, 
although they are theoretically possible under my  assumption of  decreasing 
returns to scale (but not under constant returns). 
The specific proposition is stated as follows: 
Proposition 4: If capital and labor are complements in all firms, and if the 
incentive-compatibility  constraint binds  at  the  margin  for firm i, then  the 
following conditions hold at the optimum: 
i.  pifjj(E,, Ki,) > r; 
ii. p,fk(Ei,, Ki,) < r. 
Proof: Let  A  and a,  denote the Lagrange multipliers  on constraints (42) 
and  (44). Omitting  i  as a  subscript  or  superscript to avoid clutter,  I  may 
write the first-order conditions for firm i’s outputs, Q, and Q,,  as follows: 416  John Douglas Wilson 
and 
(47)  ey(I,  ii) > ex([,  ii) 
for any given I  and  12.  It follows that, if both the type x  and the type y  firms 
employ  the  same numbers  of  workers  and  pay  them  the  same  wages  to 
produce the  same output  levels,  then  the  type y  firm  uses  more effective 
labor and less capital than the type x firm to produce this common output. 
Under the assumption that labor and capital are complements, the marginal 
product of capital is then greater in the type y firm than in the type x  firm,  or, 
since the derivative KO(') is the inverse of  this marginal product, 
Inequalities  (49)  and  (50) are  equivalent  to  i  and  ii  of  the  proposition. 
Q.E.D. 
The basic  idea behind  these results  may  be  simply explained using  the 
equivalence between  the  tax  scheme  and  truth-telling  mechanisms.  If  the 
government increases the output it wants a given firm i to choose if  its type 
is  x  (Q,),  then  the  profits  that  this  firm  receives  by  choosing  the 
wage-production plan (wX,  Q,,  N,)  change by 
Ax = pi  - rKQ[Q,, ex(I,, fi)Nxlj 
where I, = n + w,.  On the other hand, if the given firm were a type y  but 
chose the same (wx,  Q,,  NX),  then its profits would change by 
But  A,  > AX because (47) and the complementarity  assumption  imply that 
capital is more productive in y than in x. This means that the rise in Q, gives 
the type y  firm a greater incentive to masquerade as a type x firm,  relative to 
the incentive the x  firm faces to reveal its type truthfully. The marginal social 
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the firm i’s incentive-compatibility constraint. To offset this cost, a rise in Q, 
from the optimum must improve the trade balance, implying that the value of 
the marginal product of capital must exceed the world interest rate.  In other 
words, primary-sector capital should be positively taxed at the margin. By a 
similar argument, secondary-sector capital should be subsidized. 
11.3.3  Alternative Specifications 
Using the type of reasoning just given, I may quickly show that alternative 
specifications  of  the  informational  asymmetry  either  do  not  change  the 
results  or eliminate  any role  for capital  market  intervention.  Suppose  first 
that  the  government  can directly  tax  capital, employment, and  wages  but 
finds monitoring a firm’s output to be prohibitively costly.’6 Let (w,,  N,,  K,) 
be the wage-input vector that it wishes to assign a given firm i if its type is x, 
and consider an increase in K,.  If the type x firm chooses (w,,  N,,  K,),  then 
its profits change by 
Ax = pifK[PVx, kP”>  Kxl -  r, 
where again Z,  = n + w,. On the other hand, if the given firm i were type 
y  but chose to masquerade as a type x firm by  also choosing (w,,  N,,  K,), 
then it would experience a change in profits given by 
Ay = pifK[eY(I,,  LIN,,  K,1  -  r. 
Again,  eY(Z,, zi)  exceeds  ex(lx,  6) since  only  the  type  x  firm  has  the 
supervision  problem.  By  the  assumption  of  complementary  factors,  it 
follows that Ay > A,.  Increasing  primary-sector  capital  therefore increases 
the incentive for the type y  firm to masquerade as a type x firm, relative to 
the incentive of  the type x firm to reveal its type truthfully.  Again, this cost 
must be balanced by an improvement in the trade surplus, implying that pi* 
&(Ex, K,)  exceeds r at the optimum. By similar reasoning, p,fK(Ey,  K,)  falls 
short of r. 
The  story  changes  if  either  wages  or  employment  is  made  the 
unobservable  variable.  In  either  case,  if  the  government  observes  both  a 
firm’s output and capital  stock, then  it can infer the  firm’s  effective labor 
from the production function, Q  = f(E,  K).  Thus, a type y firm cannot hide 
its  true identity  unless  it chooses  the  same Q, E, and K  as a type x firm 
(although the two types will  use different effort and employment  levels to 
obtain the same E  = eN). But then the marginal product of capital in a type 
x firm choosing the (Q,, K,)  assigned to it will be identical to the marginal 
production of a y  firm choosing the same (Q,, K,).  Raising K, can therefore 
have no desirable effect on the relevant incentive-compatibility constraint for 
the  problem,  implying  that  primary-sector  capital  should  not  be  taxed  or 
subsidized at the margin.  By the same reasoning,  neither should secondary- 
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This  last argument can be  used to analyze the case where the detection 
probabilities depend positively  on unobservable managerial  effort, m,  with 
ny  exceeding nx  at any given level of m. Suppose that this managerial effort 
enters  the  firm’s  objective  function  as  an unobservable  cost.”  With  both 
output  and capital observable,  a type x firm will  again have to choose  the 
same effective  labor  as a type y  firm  in order to hide  its  true  identity.  If 
wages and employment are also observable,  this means that the type x firm 
will be able to masquerade as a type y firm only if it raises its managerial 
effort enough to equate nx  with ny.  In any case, the type y and x firms will 
again possess the same marginal products of capital if they choose the same 
levels  of  the  observable  variables.  By  the  previous  argument,  neither 
primary-  nor secondary-sector capital should then be taxed or subsidized at 
the margin. 
So  far,  uncertainty  about supervision problems has been  analyzed in the 
absence of production function uncertainty by assuming that the government 
knows each firm’s production function but not the supervision technology. A 
more  general  specification  might  also  allow the  production  function  to be 
uncertain.  In  this  case,  if  the  possibility  that  a  firm  has  a  supervision 
problem  is positively  related  to the  possibility  that its  marginal product  of 
capital is relatively  high  at any given (E,  K),  the results may  be reversed. 
This can  be  explained  intuitively.  In  the  previous  model, capital  taxation 
effectively  steers  investment  away  from  firms  with  inferior  supervision 
technologies  and  into firms  with  superior  supervision  technologies.  High 
wages in the primary  sector basically mask inefficiencies  in the production 
process,  thereby  making  the  taxation  of  primary-sector  capital  desirable. 
Differences  in  production  functions  may  offset  this  inefficiency,  however. 
Loosely  stated, the  result  is  still  that  the  sector  with  the  more  efficient 
production process should receive positive capital subsidies, but the identity 
of this  sector will now  depend on both  differences  in production functions 
and supervision technologies. 
11.4  Concluding Remarks 
To  summarize,  this  paper  finds  little  support for policies  that  subsidize 
capital investment in high-wage industries.  Indeed, the opposite conclusion 
is obtained under reasonable assumptions about informational asymmetries: a 
positive marginal tax should be placed on primary-sector capital. The driving 
force behind  this result is that the production processes used by high-wage 
firms are inferior to low-wage production processes in one particular aspect: 
the supervision technology. 
Thus, informational  asymmetries  create  a role  for basing  tax  policy  on 
efficiency  differences  between  sectors.  A  useful  task  for  future  research 
would be to examine this role in a variety of different contexts. For example, 
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then perhaps investment in high-wage jobs should still be taxed at the margin 
since high  wages  may  again  be  viewed  as masking  an  inefficiency  in the 
production process,  namely, the relatively severe worker turnover problem. 
This extension would require a dynamic model. 
Another role for a dynamic analysis would be to model the intertemporal 
process by which a government  learns the attributes of various firms.  One 
conjecture  is that  asymmetric  information  reasons  for distortionary  capital 
taxation are unimportant in the long run since the attributes of different firms 
can eventually be uncovered.  But the government's acquisition of informa- 
tion may be severely hampered by the incentives that firms face to hide those 
activities  that  may  increase  their  future  tax  burdens.  A  recent  paper  by 
Laffont and Tirole (1988) suggests that this consideration  may be a serious 
problem for tax policy. 
To  conclude,  three  limitations  of  the  asymmetric  information  analysis 
deserve emphasis. First, when interpreting all these results, it is important to 
keep  in  mind  that  only  marginal  taxes  have  been  considered,  not  average 
taxes. In fact, the two are likely to depart quite significantly  since a highly 
nonlinear tax  schedule would  be required to tax a given firm's  capital at a 
positive marginal rate if its type is x  and at a negative marginal rate if its type 
is y, as defined in the text. 
Second,  the  paper  has  not  addressed  the  issue  of  how  the  incentive- 
compatibility  constraint  affects  the  taxation  of  employment  and  wages.  I 
have  not  obtained  clear-cut  results  on  this  issue,  but  it  deserves  further 
research. 
Finally, the degree to which the results on capital taxation are sensitive to 
the  particular  informational  asymmetry  modeled  here  needs  to be further 
explored.  Section  11.3.3 has  noted  that  there  exist additional  sources  of 
uncertainty that work against proposition 4. As matters now stand, however, 
I  hope  to have  convinced  readers  that  it  is  difficult  to justify  subsidizing 
capital  investment  in  high-wage  industries  with  any  reasonable  degree  of 
confidence. 
Appendix A 
This appendix discusses  the  optimal role  of  excise taxes  in the  symmetric 
information case and how this use alters the optimal values of  the other tax 
instruments.  To study this role, I must now explicitly include the consumer 
price  vector  in  the  demand  and  utility  functions: c'(q, I, e) and  v(q,  I, e). 
Since only relative prices matter, however, good y  may be arbitrarily chosen 
as the untaxed commodity: q,,  = py. 
If c"(q,  I,,  0) > (<) cx(q,  Z,,  ex) in the absence of excise taxes, then placing 
a small positive  (negative) tax on good x  raises  v(q, Z,,  ex) -  v(q, I,,  0), 
thereby lessening the shirking problem.  This explains the following result. 420  John Douglas Wilson 
Proposition Al: At the optimum, q, $ p, as cx(q,  I,,  0) 5 cx(q,  I",  ex). 
Proofi The Lagrangian expression given by (16) must be reformulated to 
take account of excise taxes. To  do so, I use the workers' budget constraints 
to write, 
(Al)  pxcx(q,  Ii, ei) + pycY(q,  Ii, ei) = Ii  -  (4,  -  p,)cx(q,  Ii, 4. 
Using  this  equality  to  rewrite  the  trade  balance constraint  given  by  (l), 
equation (16) may be amended to read 
642)  L = NAq,  I,,  ex) + (N* -  N,)v(q,  I?, ey) 
+ UPxf"(e,N,,  K,) + pfl[e,(N* -  N,), Kyl 
+ r(K* -  K, -  K,) -  NxI, - (N* -  N$, 
+ PMq,  I,,  ex) - T,v(q, I,,  ey) - (1 - n,)v(q,  I,,  0)). 
Starting  from  the  optimum,  any  combination  of  changes  in  consumer 
prices  or  incomes  must  have a  zero  first-order  effect on the  Lagrangian. 
Consider an increase in q,,  accompanied by  increases in I,  and I, that leave 





where  d denotes a differential change.  In  other  words,  I am considering 
compensated changes in q, for both types of workers. By Roy's Identity, the 
income compensations must satisfy 
(-45)  dl, = cx(q,  Ii,  ei)dq,,  i = x,  y. 
Using (A5), the first-order change in the Lagrangian from these compensated 
price changes may then be expressed as follows: 
(A6)  dL =  -Mq,  -  p,)",dc"(q,  I,,  ex) + N,dc"(q,  I,,  e,)l 
- (4, -  p,)",cX(q,  I,,  ex) + (N* -  N,)c"(q,  1,'  e,)l) 
v&,  I?, e,)dq, + vh,  I,,  e,)dl, = 0 
v&,  1x7 %)4,  + vAq, I,,  eM, = 0, 
- p(1 -  n,)dv(q, I,,  0)  = 0. 
Another application of Roy's Identity gives the following expression for the 
first-order change in the utilities of undetected shirkers: 
(A7) 
Substituting (A5) into (A7) for dI,  and then substituting the result into (A6) 
yields 
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The demand changes in  the  first bracketed term  are  necessarily  negative 
because they result from a compensated price increase. The proposition then 
follows immediately from (A8). Q.E.D. 
Thus,  the  government  should  place  a  positive  (negative)  tax  on  con- 
sumption of  the primary-sector good  if  undetected shirkers possess higher 
(lower) demands for this good than nonshirking primary-sector workers. In 
the case of  a separable utility function,  u(c,,  cy,  e) = g(c,,  cy) - h(e), 
proposition A1  implies that the optimal q, -  p, equals zero. 
Remember that no worker actually shirks in equilibrium. The differential 
tax burden here acts as an additional incentive not to shirk without penalizing 
any worker. 
Proposition A1 offers an interesting contrast to Dixit’s (1989) finding that 
all marginal rates of  substitution should equal  world  prices,  although an 
adverse selection problem in  his  model constrains the relative utilities of 
different  workers.  The  crucial  difference  between  the  models  is  easily 
pinpointed by  Dixit’s explanation for this result: “The point is that adverse 
selection imposes incentive-compatibility constraints, but these apply to the 
utility levels, U, =  U(x,, y,),  not to the means by which they are attained. 
Therefore the usual efficiency argument for minimizing the resource costs of 
achieving the desired utility levels remains valid”  (238). In my  model, not 
only  does  the  no-shirking  condition  constrain  utility  levels,  but  the 
government is also constrained to give undetected shirkers and nonshirkers 
in the primary sector the same incomes and consumer prices. This inability 
to  achieve  desired  utility  levels  by  any  means  is  responsible  for  the 
desirability of excise taxes. 
I conclude this appendix by  describing how the presence of  excise taxes 
affects propositions 2 and 3 in the text.18 The case of marginal employment 
subsidies is  straightforward. Proposition 3 shows that work  in the primary 
sector should be subsidized relative to work in the secondary sector in the 
sense that T, < Ty (the individual values of  these taxes were  shown to be 
indeterminate in sec.  11.1.3). This claim remains valid with excise taxes if 
the definition of  the relative subsidies is modified to include differences in 
the excise tax payments: 
If  poll tax payments are added to both sides of  (A9), then the government 
budget constraint can be balanced only if  the right side is positive and the 
left is negative. As before, secondary-sector workers face a positive total tax 
burden, while primary-sector workers face a negative total tax burden. The 
only new feature is that this tax burden includes excise taxes (or subsidies). 422  John Douglas Wilson 
The required  modification  of  the  wage  tax  results  in  proposition  3  is 
described by the following formulae for the marginal wage taxes: 
and 
Account  must  now  be  taken  of  the  effects of  a  rise  in  income and  effort 
levels on the distorted pattern of  consumption. For this reason, it may now 
be  undesirable  to subsidize  wage increases  in  the primary  sector.  For  the 
secondary  sector,  whether  consumption becomes more or less distorted in 
response to a rise in the wage and effort level completely determines the sign 
of  the wage tax. Since proposition A1 shows that the optimal qx - px  can be 
positive  or negative, however,  there  appears to be  no general  presumption 
about the direction in which these new considerations  push the signs of  the 
wage taxes at the full optimum. 
Turn  finally  to proposition  2, which  shows that  primary-sector  workers 
receive  higher  incomes than  secondary-sector  workers.  If  aggregate  con- 
sumption of the commodity with a positive  (negative) tax  can be increased 
(reduced) by transferring income from primary- to secondary-sector workers, 
then  this  transfer  reduces  the  distortionary  effect  of  the  excise  tax  on 
consumption patterns. For this reason, proposition  2 may no longer hold in 
all  cases,  although  it is  hard  to imagine that  this  additional  consideration 
would  be  strong enough in practice  to reverse  the desirability  of  setting I, 
above I?. 
Appendix B 
This appendix considers the case for subsidizing primary-sector  capital when 
employment  and wage subsidies  are not available. To  keep the government 
budget balanced,  a “neutral”  tax  instrument  is used to balance  the budget, 
namely,  a uniform  poll tax  (positive or negative) imposed on each worker. 
Since such a tax  is  “lump  sum,”  it  creates  no incentive  effects by  itself. 
Capital taxes and subsidies are then  left as the only means of dealing  with 
the  multiple  distortions  described  in  section  11.2. Concrete  results  are 
therefore hard to come by in the general case. For the following analysis, I 
alter the model  in a way that allows me to concentrate on the employment 
distortion described  in  section  11.2. Specifically, I now follow the common 
practice  in  the efficiency  wage literature  of  assuming  that  the effort level 
takes  on only two values:  zero and one.  All  workers  provide one unit  of 423  Internationally Mobile Capital in an Efficiency Wage Model 
labor in equilibrium since nobody  shirks. Altered in this way, the model is 
called the ‘‘modified model .’ ’ 
My  main  result  uses  the  assumption  that  labor  and  capital  are  com- 
plements  in the  sense that  an  increase  in either factor raises  the  marginal 
product  of  the other.  In this  case,  an  increase  in the price  of  either must 
lower the demand for both: 
(Bl)  If  &(Nit  Ki)  > 0,  then  dNi/dwi < 0  and  dK,/dw, < 0, 
and similarly for a rise in r  + tKi (see Silberberg 1978, sec. 4.4). 
The main result now may be stated as follows. 
Proposition  BI: Suppose  that  tK,  = tKy = 0  initially  in  the  modified 
model.  Then  a  small  fall  in  tK,  raises  social  welfare  if  factors  are 
complements  in  the  primary  sector,  and  a  small rise  in  tKy  raises  social 
welfare if  factors are complements in the secondary sector. 
Proof. A change in either of the two taxes must leave unchanged the trade 
balance constraint, given by (13) with e, = e  = 1: 
032)  [P,f”K(N,, K,) - rIdK + [Pyf:(Ny, K,) - My  + [pxfi(Nx,  Kx) 
-  pyfWy,  K,) - (wx - wy)ldNx -  “&I,  + NydIy1 = 0, 
where a d denotes  a differential  change,  and use  is made of  the equality, 
I,  -  Iy  = w, - wy.  Given  the  absence  of  any  initial  taxes,  the 
profit-maximization conditions given by (10) and (1  1) can be used to reduce 
(B2) to the following expression: 
033)  N,dI,  + NydIy = 0. 
Equation  (B3) implies that any change in primary- and secondary-sector 
worker incomes must take place in opposite directions. But the no-shirking 
condition,  (3,  implies  that  these  changes  must  take  place  in  identical 
directions. It follows that I, and Iy do not change: 
034)  dI,  = dIy = 0 
Thus, the welfare effects of a tax change are completely determined by the 
employment  change,  dN, = - dNy.  Since  the  no-shirking  condition 
implies  that  primary-sector  workers  have  higher  utilities  than  secondary- 
sector workers, welfare rises if and only if the tax change shifts employment 
from the secondary sector to the primary sector: 
035)  dW  = (u, -  uy)dN,  > 0 
if and only if dN, > 0, where ui  =  v(Ii, 1). 
Since all workers obtain identical nonlabor incomes, (B4) also implies that 
any tax-induced changes in the primary- and secondary-sector wages must be 
identical: 424  John Douglas Wilson 
(B6)  dw, = dwY . 
This result will be used to sign dN.,. 
Suppose  that  factors  are  complements  in  the  secondary  sector,  and 
consider  a  rise  in  tKy. If  N,  fails  to  rise,  then  Ny cannot  fall,  and  the 
assumption of complements implies that wy must fall to offset the negative 
effect of tKY  on Ny.  Then w, falls to satisfy (B6), which implies that N, rises, 
contradicting the initial assumption. 
Suppose that factors are complements in the primary sector, and consider a 
fall in tK,.  If N, fails to rise, then the assumption of complements implies that 
w, must rise to offset the positive effect of the decline in tKx  on N,.  Then wY 
rises  to  satisfy  (B6),  which  implies  that  Ny falls,  contradicting  the 
assumption that N, does not rise. Q.E.D. 
The basic explanation for this result  is that welfare can be  improved  by 
undertaking policies that encourage labor to flow from the secondary sector 
to  the  primary  sector.  Given  the  complementarity  assumption,  one  such 
policy is to encourage capital investment in the primary sector, while another 
is to discourage capital investment in the secondary sector. But dropping this 
assumption leads to ambiguous results and thereby highlights the roundabout 
nature  of  capital  taxation  as  a  means  of  encouraging employment  in  the 
primary sector. 
Appendix C 
This appendix shows by  way of an example that the incentive-compatibility 
constraint in section 11.3 is binding in some cases but not in others. Since 
the example contains risk neutral  consumers,  it also demonstrates that  the 
asymmetric  information  problem  described  in  section  1 1.3 may  render 
infeasible the first-best allocation, even if  there is no social cost attached to 
the income inequality required to eliminate shirking. 
By  risk  neutrality,  I  mean  that  utility  is linear in  income.  It  is  further 
assumed that the disutility of labor effort is a perfect substitute with income, 
in which case the indirect utility function may be written 
(C1)  v(Z, e) = Z -  h(e); h’(e)  > 0,  h”(e)  2  0. 
(The coefficient of Z  is set equal to one to simplify notation.) Equation (Cl) 
allows  the  no-shirking  condition  faced  by  type  x  firms  (eq.  [5]), to  be 
reexpressed 
(C2) 
while the utility requirement faced by type y  firms is 
(C3) 
Zxn, -  h(e,) 2 r,ii, 
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For part of my example, I shall work with the following simple form of the 
effort disutility function: 
(C4)  hie) = e+l,  q 2 1. 
On the production side of the model,  I simplify matters by assuming that 
all firms produce the same good using identical production functions and that 
they possess identical probabilities of being a type x firm: 
for all i.  Thus, the only difference between firms is their unknown detection 
probabilities: v,  < v.y =  1. 
Following the text, the number of firms is assumed to be large enough for 
actual aggregate income to be reasonably approximated by expected income. 
Normalizing  the number of firms to equal one, aggregate income may then 
be written 
(C6)  IA = JIN,I,  + (1 -  +)NyIy  . 
Social welfare may then be written 
(C7)  w=IA- [*N,hk,)  +  (1 - *w* -  N,)h(eJl. 
This  is also social welfare  when  each  firm's  type, x or y, is known to the 
government  since the probability + simply becomes  the known  fraction of 
type x firms. 
I now investigate whether the incentive-compatibility constraint is satisfied 
under  the  solution  to  the  symmetric  information  problem  and,  therefore, 
whether it is a binding constraint in the asymmetric information problem. 
Since only aggregate income enters the social welfare function, no loss of 
generality is involved in setting Iy = 0 and giving all the income to workers 
in the primary sector since doing so maximizes the set of effort levels that are 
consistent with the no-shirking condition (eq. [C2]).  (Alternatively, if there is 
a minimum subsistence income greater than zero, I, may be set equal to its 
value.) Except for relatively  low values of vX,  the no-shirking condition will 
then fail to bind and can therefore be omitted from the problem. In other words, 
the first-best solution will be feasible. This is the case I consider. 
The control variables for the government's maximization problem are IA, 
ex,  ey, N,,  K,,  and  K,.  They  are  chosen  to  maximize  social  welfare,  as 
defined by (C7), subject to the trade balance constraint, 
(C8)  $pf(e,N,,  K,)  + (1 - $)pflIe,(N* -  N,), 41 
+ r[K* - $K, - (1 -  +)Ky] -  IA 2 0. 
Given the symmetry of  the problem, the solution calls for treating all firms 
alike along every dimension  except  income  (with  I, >  Iy to take  care of 
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(C9)  e, = e,  = e',  K, = K, = K',  N, = Ny = N' 
Let us now consider whether an allocation with properties (C9) can satisfy 
the  incentive-compatibility  constraint  for  the  asymmetric  information 
problem. For the two types of firms both to be willing to choose e', f,  and I, 
must be set so that 
(ClO) 
With incomes so determined,  the  incentive-compatibility condition ([44] in 
the text) becomes 
e"(f,v,  ii) = e,(f,,  ii) = e',  ii  = Z,  ~  h(e'). 
(C11)  K[Q', df,,  6)N'I -  K[Q', @(I,,  ii)N'1 
3  K[Q',  @(I,,  ii)N'] - K[Q',  eY(I,,  ii)N'], 
where Q' is the common output level for both types of  firms under (C9). 
Whether (C1 1) holds will depend on the properties of both the production 
function  and  the  effort  functions.  For  the  latter  functions,  I  prove  the 
following fundamental result. 
Claim: Under assumptions (Cl)  and (C4), e#,  ii) < ey(f,  ii) for all f and  11. 
Proof: By definition, 
(C12) 
and, using (C2), 
(C13) 
h[ev(f,  ii)] = f  -  ii, 
h[e"(f,  ii)]  = T,[f  -  ii]. 
Since h'(e)  = qh(e)/  e under (C4), (C12) and (C13) give 
(C  14) 
and 
h'(ey)ey = q(f - ii)(eF/ey)  =  I 
(C15)  h'(e")ef  = T,q(f -  ii)(ef/c?)  = T, , 
where  the arguments of  functions  ex and  ey have been  omitted to simplify 
notation.  Since ex(f,  ii)  <  eY(f, ii),  (C14)  and  ((215)  imply  that  e#,  ii) 
< er(f,  ii). Q.E.D. 
Thus, the  increase  in  effort levels that  a firm  can  obtain  by  increasing 
worker incomes from f, to f,  is less for the type x firms than for the type y 
firms. The crucial implication of this claim is 
(C16) 
By itself, (C16) clearly works against the satisfaction of  (Cll). 
But  production  considerations  work  in  the  opposite  direction.  In  par- 
ticular, if  we assume as before that capital and labor are complements,  then 
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it  is  easily  shown that  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  effective 
labor and capital at a given  (I, Q, N) is higher for a type x firm than  for a 
type y firm: 
(C17)  -KE[Q, @(I, BIN1 > -KE[Q, eYV7  BIN]. 
The basic  reasoning  comes from the  inequality,  e”(1, 6) < eY(l,  a). When 
the type x and y firms pay the same numbers of workers the same incomes to 
produce the same Q, the  type x  firm  uses  more capital  and  less  effective 
labor. As a result,  its marginal product of capital is lower and its marginal 
product of labor higher than those for the type y firm. Thus, the amount of 
capital needed  to compensate  for a unit reduction in effective labor is then 
greater in the type x firm than in the type y firm; that is, (C17) holds. 
This  production  consideration  clearly  works  in  favor  of  (Cll), but  the 
assumption  of  complements  implies  nothing  about  the  magnitude  of  the 
difference  in  (C17). Indeed,  the  form of  the  production  function  may  be 
varied to make this difference as small or large as desired, thereby producing 
examples  where  (C11) holds  and  examples  where  it  does not.  Thus,  the 
first-best  optimum  is  feasible  in  some  asymmetric  problems  but  not  in 
others. 
Finally,  I  demonstrate  that,  no  matter  how  severely  (C11)  limits  the 
solution to the asymmetric information,  the assumption that the two factors 
are complements  implies that it is never optimal to implement  a  “pooling 
equilibrium,”  where  both  types  of  firms  are  assigned  the  same (I, Q, N). 
Under this solution, the equality 1,  = Iy  would give Ex = e,N  <ey  N  = Ey, 
implying that K,  > K,.  By the assumption of complements,  it would follow 
thatfK(E,,  K,)  <  fK(Ey,  Ky),  which violates proposition  4. While this prop- 
osition  assumes  that  the  incentive-compatibility  constraint  is  binding 
at  the  margin,  dropping  that  assumption  would  imply  that fK(Ex,  K,)  = 
fK(Ey,  ICY), which is again inconsistent with a pooling equilibrium. 
Notes 
1. Throughout this paper, the term first best refers to the allocation that would be 
socially optimal in the absence of supervision problems. 
2.  The  interest  rate  referred  to  here  and  throughout  the  paper  is,  of  course, 
calculated net of  taxes levied abroad. The analysis does not depend on whether the 
given country is a net capital exporter or importer, but in the latter case my  formal 
model ignores foreign tax credits. I argue in sec. 11.2.2  that my  results, if properly 
interpreted, are not affected by foreign tax credits. 
3.  An  economy  with  many  firms  is  explicitly  considered  when  I  model 
government uncertainty about the identity of firms with worker supervision problems. 
4.  The  production  and  utility  functions  in  this  paper  are  assumed  to be  twice 
continuously differentiable. 428  John Douglas Wilson 
5.  Labor  effort  is  measured  continuously  here,  although  many  studies  in  the 
literature  assume  that  e  takes  only  two  values,  zero  for  shirkers  and  one  for 
nonshirkers  (Sparks  1986 is  an  important  exception).  The  present  specification is 
needed for the asymmetric information problem in sec. 11.3, and it is responsible for 
the role of marginal wage subsidies in sec. 11.2. 
6. Since the production function is strictly concave, maximum profits will always 
be positive if  the profit-maximizing output level is positive,  as assumed throughout 
the paper. 
7.  I assume that the effort functions are strictly concave in income, in which case 
the  profit-maximizing  wage  varies  continuously  with  the  tax  parameters.  This 
assumption holds under reasonable assumptions about utility. 
8. More generally, no utility differences of any type arc allowed between workers 
in  the  secondary  sector,  even  when  different  secondary-sector  firms  are  later 
explicitly included in the model. Examples could presumably be constructed in which 
welfare  is  improved  by  providing  workers  in  these  different  firms  with  different 
utilities,  but  such examples  would be  undesirably  sensitive to ad  hoc assumptions 
about the rationing mechanism by which detected shirkers get reallocated across these 
firms.  In a related  development,  the  optimal  commodity  tax  literature has already 
demonstrated the potential desirability of “random taxation”  (e.g., Stiglitz 1982; and 
Chang and Wildasin 1986), but the principle of “horizontal  equity”  is often invoked 
to rule out its use. 
9.  Given that property  taxes paid  by  domestic  firms are not credited by  foreign 
governments, property subsidies might serve the stated purpose. If subsidies outside 
the crediting system were not available,  the domestic government would  then face 
incentives  to  lower  the  effective  cost  of  capital  through  various  expenditure 
programs. 
10. The results would not change if detection probabilities were allowed to differ 
across firms in the primary sector. 
11.  Different firms may produce identical or different goods. 
12.  The  optimal  tax  functions  will  generally  vary  across  firms  if  production 
functions differ.  My  results  will  concern  properties  that  are  common  to  all  these 
functions,  suggesting that the  same properties  would often  hold if  the  government 
were forced to confront different firms with identical tax functions. 
13. Defining the capital tax in terms of this difference has the desirable feature of 
not requiring that the optimal tax function T’(w, Q,  N)  be differentiable,  which may 
not be the case. For a similar procedure with regard to optimal income taxation,  see 
Stiglitz (1987b, 1003). 
14.  The actual optimization problem contains only total income, I,,  rather than its 
components, n and we,  as control variables. In fact, any positive n and w0’s that sum 
to the optimal I,,’s  are then optimal.  (Recall the  nonuniqueness of  the optimal tax 
system discussed in sec. 11.1.3.) As  a pedagogical device, however, it is useful first 
to fix the government’s choice of  n. 
15.  Paradoxically,  the  same  assumption  is  also  used  in  App.  B  to  prove  that 
primary-sector  capital  should  be  subsidized  at  the  margin  while  secondary-sector 
capital should be positively taxed when no other tax instruments are available. 
16. For a general analysis of principal-agent problems of this type, with a special 
application to the  optimal  regulation  of  a labor  managed  firm,  see Guesnerie  and 
Laffont (  1984). 
17. For  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  optimal  regulation  of  a  firm  when  the 
government can observe  both  output and costs but  where costs can be reduced  by 
means  of  unobservable  managerial  effort,  see  Laffont  and  Tirole  (1986).  A 
particularly exciting feature of their work is that they allow costs to be stochastic at 
the time the firm chooses output and effort levels. 
18. Proofs of the results reported here are available from the author on request. 429  Internationally Mobile Capital in an Efficiency Wage Model 
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Comment  Lawrence F. Katz 
The  basic  question  addressed  in  Wilson’s  interesting  paper  is  whether 
noncompetitive  interindustry  wage  differentials  provide  a  rationale  for 
industrial policies in an economy with internationally mobile capital. This is 
a particularly important question to analyze given recent concern with U.S. 
competitiveness in strategic sectors and worries about shifts in employment 
from  sectors that  provide  high-wage,  “good jobs”  to sectors that  provide 
low-wage,  “bad jobs.” 
Any economic justification for worrying about the sectoral composition of 
output must rely on the presence of  market imperfections that drive a wedge 
between  the  marginal  productivities  of  factors  in different  sectors.  Wilson 
focuses on a labor market distortion within the context of an efficiency wage 
model in which a worker supervision problem requiring a wage premium is 
present in one sector (the primary sector) and absent in the other sector (the 
secondary sector). 
In  the  first part of  the  paper,  Wilson  extends  the  Bulow-Summers  dual 
labor  market  model  by  introducing  capital  in  the  production  function  and 
making capital perfectly  internationally mobile. Wilson concludes that there 
is no role for the use of  sectoral  capital  taxes and subsidies in the optimal 
government policy in this model when other instruments are available. This 
is not surprising since the distortion  arises in the labor market (the wage is 
above opportunity  costs  in  the  primary  sector)  and  can be  directly  solved 
through  policies  that  serve to subsidize employment  in the primary  sector. 
The inclusion  of  capital and open economy considerations adds little to the 
analysis of this model. On the other hand, this section of the paper is useful 
in  showing  how  the  exact  form  of  labor  market  policies  (wage  vs. 
employment  subsidies and taxes) depends on the exact  specification  of  the 
monitoring  technology  in  a shirking model.  The conclusion  of  no role for 
sectoral capital tax and subsidy policies also depends on the choice of model. 
In models where noncompetitive  wage differentials arise from the differen- 
tial ability of workers to extract product market rents and sunk investments 
in different sectors, the labor market distortion may take the form of a tax on 
investment that differs across sectors (Grout 1984; Katz and Summers 1989). 
In  this  case,  even  though  the  distortion  arises  in  the  labor  market,  its 
interaction with  capital  investment decisions means that  the optimal policy 
may  involve  subsidies  to  investment  in  sectors  where  investments  are 
particularly appropriable by  labor. 
The second part  of  the paper adds asymmetric  information to a shirking 
model.  The government  is assumed  not  to know the identity  of  firms with 
supervision  problems  requiring  premium  wages.  While  there  are  many 
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reasons  to  be  skeptical  of  industrial  policies  and  of  the  ability  of  the 
government to determine whether wage differentials represent ‘‘labor rents’ ’ 
rather  than  competitive  differentials,  the  incentive  compatibility  issues 
discussed in the second part of the paper do not seem particularly relevant. 
The government  surely has  no problem  differentiating  firms in high-wage 
sectors (e.g., steel and auto plants)  from those in low-wage sectors (e.g., 
fast  food  restaurants  and  retail  stores).  The  more  relevant  issue  is  the 
political  economy  issue  of  how  to  control  rent-seeking  activities  once 
significant  subsidies  become  potentially  available  to  potentially  affected 
groups that  can commission economists and  statisticians to document that 
their  industries  provide  high-rent  jobs  that  should  be  subsidized.  These 
political  problems,  emphasized  in  critiques of  sectoral  policies  by  Aaron 
(1989) and Schultze (1983), are not well illuminated in the mathematics of 
truth-telling  constraints  highlighted  by  Wilson’s  asymmetric  information 
model. 
The Wilson  paper takes  as given  the existence of  noncompetitive  wage 
differentials  arising  from  differences  in  the  importance  of  supervision 
problems  among  firms.  Many  other  discussions  of  industrial  policies 
presume the existence of  identifiable “good jobs”  and “bad jobs.” In fact, 
much  recent  empirical  research  has  examined  the  nature  of  interindustry 
wage  differentials  (e.g.,  Dickens  and  Katz  1987; Krueger  and  Summers 
1988; and Katz and Summers 1989). The basic finding is that there are large, 
systematic, persistent interindustry wage differentials that remain even after 
controlling  for all  observable  worker  and  job  characteristics  available  in 
micro  data  sets.  For  example,  workers  in  autos, aircraft,  and  petroleum 
consistently earn 20-40  percent more than workers with the same measured 
characteristics in apparel, retail trade, and repair services. Interindustry wage 
differentials are remarkably  similar across developed economies and highly 
correlated  over time.  The persistence over time  suggests they  are not just 
transitory  differentials.  The  similarity  across  countries  means  that  they 
reflect  something  fundamental  in  the  nature  of  advanced  industrial 
economies rather than particular labor market institutions. The differentials 
appear even larger when one includes employee benefits in measures of labor 
compensation. 
High-wage industries have lower quit rates and face longer queues of job 
applicants than low-wage industries. These findings indicate that interindus- 
try  wage differentials are not  largely  compensating differentials.  The low 
quit rates and long job queues in high-wage-differential  sectors are easy to 
explain if these jobs provide labor rents. An alternative view is that industry 
wage differentials reflect the sorting of workers across industries on the basis 
of  unmeasured  ability  (Murphy  and  Tope1  1987).  Longitudinal  studies 
(reviewed in Katz and Summers 1989) find that the wage changes of industry 
switchers are  quite  similar to  estimated  cross-sectional differentials.  This 
evidence casts doubt on the view that these differentials reflect sorting on 432  John Douglas Wilson 
time-invariant,  unobserved  productive  ability.  Furthermore,  industry  wage 
differentials  are highly  correlated across  occupations.  Industries  that  pay 
their  managers  wage  premia  also  pay  wage  premia  to  their  secretaries, 
laborers,  and  janitors.  It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  industries  that  need 
high-ability  managers  also  always  need  high-ability  janitors.  This  strong 
correlation  across  occupations  combined  with  the  finding  that  wage 
differentials  are  strongly  positively  correlated  with  measures  of  product 
market  rents  per  worker  and appropriable capital  per  worker  suggests that 
these differentials may reflect rent-sharing  considerations. 
The overall evidence does appear to be fairly persuasive that there do exist 
large noncompetitive  interindustry  wage differentials.  Since profits  account 
for a small share of value added relative to labor compensation, even small 
noncompetitive differences in wages across industries are likely to have more 
significant allocative  consequences than variations  in capital  rents. In  fact, 
Katz  and  Summers  (1989)  find  that  even  conservative  estimates  of  the 
variation  in  labor  rents  across  sectors  are  substantially  larger  than  the 
variation  in  capital rents.  This suggests that  Wilson’s  emphasis on labor 
market distortions rather than on profit shifting considerations in his analysis 
of  industrial  policies  is  well  placed.  More  work  on  the  sources  of 
noncompetitive  wage differentials  is  clearly  required  before  strong policy 
statements can be made given that different models of differentials can lead 
to quite different  predictions.  Furthermore, any  economic case for activist 
policy must be tempered by a recognition of the formidable difficulties likely 
to be encountered in the implementation of  policies  that pick  “good”  and 
“bad”  industries. 
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